Diaz v. United States Textile Corp.: Accidental Injuries Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment by Marr, Paul R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 62 | Number 6 Article 37
8-1-1984
Diaz v. United States Textile Corp.: Accidental
Injuries Arising Out of and In the Course of
Employment
Paul R. Marr
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul R. Marr, Diaz v. United States Textile Corp.: Accidental Injuries Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 1456
(1984).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol62/iss6/37
Diaz v. United States Textile Corp.: Accidental Injuries Arising
Out of and In the Course of Employment
An injury is compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Compensa-
tion Act' only if it is an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment . *... 2 The worker need not show negligence attributable to
the employer, and contributory negligence on the part of the claimant is not a
bar to compensation.3 In Diaz v. United States Textile Corporation,4 however,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied compensation to an employee
and intimated that the employee's contributory negligence was the basis for
the court's refusal to affirm the Industrial Commission's award of compensa-
tion.5 If the contributory negligence doctrine was the basis for the court's de-
cision, the Diaz holding represents an erroneous application of North
Carolina's workers' compensation law.6 This note examines the Diaz court's
construction of the phrase "injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment."
Carlos Diaz worked as an electrician for defendant. The Industrial Com-
mission found that his duties included installing certain machines in defend-
ant's textile plant, and adapting the machines to the existing voltage at the
plant.7 In the course of these duties, Diaz entered one of the electrical substa-
tions located on defendant's premises to determine whether the power source
"was resistant enough to bear the load of the charge that was going to be put
upon it . . . He gained entrance to the enclosed sub-station by placing a
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
2. Id § 97-2(6) (1979). This phrase has been the subject of much judicial analysis. See,
e.g., Note, Workmen's Compensation-Accident Arising Out of and In Course of Employment In
North Carolina, 10 N.C.L. REv. 373, 373 (1932).
There is only one exception to the rule that an injury must occur accidentally to be compensa-
ble: occupational diseases are compensable even though they do not occur as the result of acci-
dent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979).
3. This change in the common law resulted from the fact that,
[w]orkers' compensation laws were a statutory compromise. The ... acts assured work-
ers compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment without
their having to prove negligence on the part of the employer. In exchange for the em-
loyer's loss of common law defenses... the employee gave up his right to common
aw verdicts .... In effect, tort liability was replaced with no fault liability.
Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 125, 284 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1981), disc. rev'denied, 305 N.C.
395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982). Furthermore, "'It is generally conceded by all courts that the various
compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying
recovery.'" Archie v. Greene Bros. Lumber Co., 222 N.C. 477, 480, 23 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1943)(quoting Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 33, 153 S.E. 594, 596 (1930)). See also Hartley
v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962); Vause v. Vause
Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88,91,63 S.E.2d 173, 175-76 (1951);see infra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
4. 60 N.C. App. 712, 299 S.E.2d 843, disc. rep. denied, 308 N.C. 386, 302 S.E.2d 250 (1983).
5. The court found that claimant's injuries were not the result of an accident because he
"should have known" that his actions would result in "severe electrical bums." Id at 717, 299
S.E.2d at 846.
6. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
7. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 714, 299 S.E.2d at 845.
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wooden stepladder against the fence ... and climbing over [it]." 8 While in-
side, Diaz "made an inspection of the transformer and discovered a piece of
wood, approximately two to three feet long resting between a wire and one of
the transformers. He did nothing about the board at that time, and left the
sub-station."9 After a coffee break, Diaz "decided to reenter the substation
and remove the piece of wood to avoid a serious accident . . . . When he
reached the piece of wood, he gave it a hard blow with his left hand. . .[and]
received a great electrical shock."' 0 As a result, both of plaintiffs arms had to
be amputated.""II
The Commission found that claimant "sustained an injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment,' 12 and awarded compen-
sation. The court of appeals reversed.' 3 The evidence presented to the Com-
mission was conflicting. First, evidence was presented that cast doubt on
whether the injury was an accident. The court noted the alleged existence of a
suicide note.' 4 Furthermore, Diaz offered contradictory explanations of why
he attempted to remove the board-initially explaining that "he needed a
board inside the fence,"' 5 but later testifying that "the piece of wood could fall
and provoke an accident, so I decided to remove it."'16 Moreover, both Diaz's
coworkers and others investigating the incident testified that they found no
board inside the substation.' 7 Second, evidence was presented that cast doubt
on whether Diaz's injury occurred "in the course of employment." Diaz had
never entered the electrical substation before' 8 and had not been directed to
do so.' 9
Although these factors cast doubt on the Commission's decision, "[tihe
finding of the Commission. . .is conclusive if supported by any competent
evidence." 20 The court's review is "limited. . .to two questions of law...:
(1) Whether or not there was any competent evidence before the Commission
to support its findings of fact; and (2) whether or not the findings of fact...
justify. . . the legal conclusions and decisions."' 2' Thus, the determination of




11. Id at 713, 299 S.E.2d at 844.
12. Id at 714, 299 S.E.2d at 845.
13. Id at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 847.
14. Id The record does not state when, and under what circumstances, the alleged suicide
note written by plaintiff was found. The court deemed it unnecessary to consider defendant's
contention that the note should be admitted into evidence because of the court's disposition of the
case. Id
15. Id at 716, 299 S.E.2d at 846. A deputy sheriff testified that Diaz offered this explanation
to him at Duke Hospital. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id at 714, 299 S.E.2d at 845.
19. Id at 716, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
20. Cole v. Guilford County, 259 N.C. 724, 726, 131 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1963).
21. Henry v. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 447, 449, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1950).
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question of law and fact,22 one in which the court must give due regard to the
Commission's findings.
The statutory condition that an injury is compensable only if caused by
an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" is intended to
separate work-related injuries from nonwork-related injuries.23 Its primary
function is to determine the relationship between injury and employment.24
The test is composed of three parts, the first of which requires that the injury
be the result of an accident.25 The North Carolina courts define "accident" as
"an unlooked for and untoward event. . not expected or designed by the
person who suffers the injury."26 An accidental injury is fortuitous and
unintentional. 27
The court in Diaz, however, held that the evidence did not satisfy the
requirements of injury by accident. 28 This was because the claimant, "an ex-
perienced electrician, should have known that if he hit a wet board with his
bare hand while standing on wet grass and while the board was resting on a
wire with at least 3,000 volts of electricity running through it, he would receive
severe electrical burns."'29
Whether a claimant "should have known" is not the appropriate test;
rather, the standard is whether claimant "expected or designed" the injury3 0
The court's holding implies that Diaz's injuries were not by accident because
he was negligent. The court's finding was an erroneous application of work-
ers' compensation law because even gross negligence is no defense to a com-
pensation claim.31 The elimination of contributory negligence is a foundation
of the Workers' Compensation Act.32
The second and third requirements of the test, that the accident "arise out
of" and "in the course of" employment "are not, and should not be, applied
entirely independently . . . . [D]eficiencies in the strength of one factor are
sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other."33 At this point,
however, it will be helpful to examine the phrases separately.
The phrase "arising out of the employment" refers to the origin or cause
of the injury.34 It is not enough that the injury occurs at the workplace; rather,
it must be "a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment
and a natural result of one of its risks, so that there is some causal relation
22. Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977).
23. Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 281, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976).
24. Id
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979).
26. Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Coop., 246 N.C. 274, 278, 98 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1957).
27. See Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 472, 8 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1940).
28. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717-18, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
29. Id at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 846 (emphasis added).
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962).
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 281, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976) (quoting 1
A. LARsoN, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW § 29.00 (1972)).
34. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1972).
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between the injury and the performance of some service of the employ-
ment."35 Furthermore, the risk generally must be one that a reasonable per-
son would assume to be "incidental to the service when he entered the
employment." 36
The employee in question, however, need not have perceived the risk
before the injury occurred. It is sufficient that the injury be "one which, after
the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the employment."
37 If it
originated in the employment, it need not be shown that it ought to have been
foreseen or expected.38
The court in Diaz did not explicitly address whether plaintiff's injury
arose out of the employment, but implied that it did not. Diaz's duties, accord-
ing to the court, did not include having to connect the wiring from the substa-
tion to the machinery, nor was Diaz directed by his superiors to enter the
substation. 39 Furthermore, even if one of his duties was to check the voltage
in the substation, Diaz had completed the duty before he reentered the substa-
tion.40 Therefore, the court seemed to imply that the claimant was acting
outside the scope of his employment by reentering the substation and attempt-
ing to remove the board.4 1
If the court intended to imply that Diaz's injury did not arise out of the
employment, such a finding is incorrect. Whether Diaz's duties included
checking the power source does not determine whether the injury arose out of
the employment. An employee may perform a task beyond the scope of his
assigned duties if he reasonably believes that it will further his employer's
interests.4 2 The Commission believed Diaz's explanation that he was attempt-
ing to eliminate a safety hazard, and therefore properly may have found that
Diaz reasonably believed that he was furthering his employer's interests. A
reviewing court is bound by the Commission's finding if any competent evi-
dence exists to support it.4 3
35. Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 274, 136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964). See also
Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448,455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1968) ("When an injury cannot fairly be
traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, or if it comes from a hazard...
common to others, it does not arise out of the employment.").
36. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 239, 188 S.E.2d 350, 354. See also Allred v. Allred-
Gardner, Inc., 253 N.C. 554, 557, 117 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1960) ("Where any reasonable relationship
to the employment exists, or employment is a contributory cause, the court is justified in uphold-
ing the award as 'arising out of employment.' ").
37. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266, 269 (1930).
38. Id at 726, 153 S.E. at 269. See also Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132
S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963).
39. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
40. Id
41. Id
42. According to Professor Larson, "an employee who honestly attempts to serve his em-
ployer's interests by some act outside of his fixed duties should not be held to the exercise of
infallible judgment on what best serves those interests." I LARSON, supra note 33, at § 27.12.
Accord Stubblefield v. Watson Elec. Co., 277 N.C. 444, 177 S.E.2d 882 (1970); Guest v. Brenner
Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955). For application of this doctrine to the "in
the course of employment" part of the test, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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The third requirement of the test, that the employee be injured "in the
course of the employment," refers "to the time, place and circumstances under
which an accidental injury occurs." 44 Since there was no dispute that Diaz
was injured during his working hours and on his employer's premises, only the
"circumstances" part of the test need be considered here. "[W]here the em-
ployee is engaged in activity which he is authorized to undertake and which is
calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer's business, ' 4 the cir-
cumstances are said to be within the course of employment.
The court of appeals relied in part upon Diaz's apparent lack of authority
to enter the substation in holding that the injury did not occur in the course of
employment.46 Whether Diaz was authorized to enter the substation, how-
ever, is not dispositive. If he "had reasonable grounds to believe that the act
. . . was incidental to his employment, or. . . would prove beneficial to his
employer's interest. . ., compensation may be recovered, since then a causal
connection between the employment and the accident may be established." 47
If Diaz reasonably believed that his act was either incidental to his employ-
ment or beneficial to his employer's interest, then compensation was proper.
A second reason for the court's finding that Diaz's injury did not occur in
the course of employment was that, under either of the explanations Diaz gave
for his behavior, he acted outside the scope of his employment. The court held
that Diaz "was not doing what a man so employed may reasonably do at a
time he was employed and at a place where he may have been during the time
to do that thing."48
The court's decision may have been influenced by Diaz's contradictory
explanations of why he hit the board, the testimony that no board was found
inside the substation after the accident, and the alleged existence of a suicide
note.49 All of these factors suggest that Diaz may have intended to injure or
kill himself. If this were so, Diaz's injuries would not be the result of an acci-
dent,50 and denial of compensation would be proper.5 ' The weighing of this
44. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1972).
45. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 456, 162 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1968).
46. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717, 299 S.E. 2d at 846.
47. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 456, 162 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1964). The supreme court held
in 1982 that:
"[C]ompensability of a claim basically turns upon whether or not the employee was act-
ing for the benefit of his employer 'to any appreciable extent' when the accident occurred
. . . Such a determination depends largely upon the unique facts of each particular
case, and, in close cases, the benefit of the doubt. . . should be given to the employee in
accordance with the established policy of liberal construction and application of the
Workers' Compensation Act."
Hoffman v. Ryder Truck Lines, 306 N.C. 502, 506, 293 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1982) (quoting Guest v.
Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 452, 85 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1955)).
48. Diaz, 60 N.C. App. at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 846.
49. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
50. Under the generally accepted definition of the term "accident," the injury must not have
been "expected or designed" by the employee. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12(3) (1979), which states in pertinent part: "No compensation
shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by:. . . (3) His
willful intention to injure or kill himself or another."
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evidence is within the province of the Industrial Commission, however, and
must be accepted as fact by a reviewing court if supported by any competent
evidence.52 Applying the Commission's findings of fact to the law, an award
of compensation was proper.
The Diaz decision represents an erroneous application of workers' com-
pensation law and should be overruled expressly by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. By holding that the claimant's injuries did not arise by acci-
dent because he "should have known" that injury would result from his ac-
tions, the court of appeals incorrectly interjected the concept of contributory
negligence into workers' compensation law.53 By rejecting the Commission's
findings that Diaz reasonably believed his actions were incidental to his em-
ployment and would further his employer's interests, the court of appeals re-
jected findings of fact that were supported by competent evidence and were
therefore binding on the court. Until Diaz is disapproved by a higher court it
may invite the Industrial Commission and other panels of the court of appeals
to deny meritorious claims under a misconception of the law.
PAUL R. MARR
52. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 3, 31, and accompanying text.
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